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IntroductIon
 Once upon a time, not very long ago, there were more states where a 
same-sex couple could enter into a civil union or domestic partnership than states 
where they could marry.1 In the wake of United States v. Windsor,2 the federal 
government has largely ended its discriminatory policy of denying recognition to
1.     In July 2011, nine states, plus the District of Columbia, permitted same-sex couples to 
form civil unions or domestic partnerships that provided full or virtually full state-level spou-
sal rights, while only six states, plus the District of Columbia, permitted same-sex couples 
to marry; at that time, there were three additional states that had created alternative statuses 
that provided partial spousal rights. See Marriage Equality & Other Relationship Recogni-
tion Laws, Hum. rts. campaIgn (July 6, 2011), http://www.hrc.org/state_maps (on file with 
author). Analysis of data from the 2010 census suggests that, at that time, there were approxi-
mately 220,000 same-sex couples in formal legal relationships, split almost evenly between 
those who were married and those who were in civil unions or domestic partnerships. See 
Brief for Gary J. Gates as Amicus Curiae on the Merits Supporting Respondent Windsor at 
25, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307). 
2.     133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
*   Associate Professor, Indiana University Maurer School of Law
** John Paul Stevens Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, Northwestern Uni-
versity. Both authors thank Patricia Cain, Douglas NeJaime, Julie Wilensky, and Tobias Bar-
rington Wolff for extremely helpful comments and Pegeen Bassett for research assistance. 
We are also grateful to the editors of the Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality for their 
extremely conscientious work. 
same-sex couples who are married.3 However, the federal government still refuses 
to recognize alternative legal statuses that impose precisely the same rights and 
responsibilities on couples as marriage and which were explicitly created to be 
equivalent to marriage. This misguided and discriminatory policy is based on a 
mindlessly literalist approach to statutory interpretation that should be repudiated.
 To be sure, the harms caused by the federal government’s policy have been 
mitigated by the rapid expansion of marriage rights at the state level. All of the 
states that currently permit, or previously permitted, couples to enter into such 
alternative statuses have also begun permitting same-sex couples to marry, and it is 
likely that the Supreme Court may soon hold that the remaining state bans on same-
sex marriage are unconstitutional.4 Nonetheless, the denial of federal recognition to 
alternative statuses continues to be problematic for several reasons. There are some 
same-sex couples who formed civil unions or domestic partnerships when marriage 
was not an option that now may lack the capacity to marry; for such couples, the 
putative availability of legal marriage is of no avail.5 Couples who entered into an 
alternative status and have since married may be hurt by the federal government’s 
refusal to recognize civil unions or domestic partnerships retroactively, even in 
situations where it is now recognizing marriages retroactively.6 And finally, some 
couples may remain in, or enter into, alternative statuses precisely because they 
have determined that it is advantageous to be “married” for state purposes but 
“unmarried” for federal purposes.7 While this is permissible under the existing 
statutory regimes, it threatens to subvert the policy choices that are built into the 
interlocking federal and state systems. 
 The federal government’s explanations for denying recognition to civil 
unions or domestic partnerships have been remarkably opaque, but they seem to 
have something to do with the fact that these unions are not called “marriages.” 
3.     The federal government now recognizes same-sex marriages as valid for most purposes, 
even if the couple lives in a state that does not recognize the marriage. However, married 
couples living in non-recognition states are still denied key rights under the Social Security 
Act and certain veterans’ benefits. See Deborah A. Widiss, Non-Marital Families and (or 
After?) Marriage Equality, 42 Fla. st. u. l. rev. 547 (2015). 
4.     Alternative statuses providing full or partial spousal rights are available in ten states plus 
the District of Columbia. Civil Unions & Domestic Partnership Statutes, nat’l conF. oF st. 
legIslatures (last updated Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/
civil-unions-and-domestic-partnership-statutes.aspx. All of these states also now permit same-
sex couples to marry; the expansion of marriage rights in many of these states was required 
by court decisions holding that the denial of marriage rights was unconstitutional. See States, 
Freedom to marry, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/ (March 4, 2015). A pending 
Supreme Court case may well result in nationwide marriage rights for same-sex couples. See 
DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted sub nom. Bourke v. Beshear, 
135 S. Ct. 1041 (2015) (No. 14-574).
5.     See infra text accompanying note 59.
6.     See infra text accompanying notes 60–62. 
7.     See infra text accompanying notes 63–64. 
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The government appears to embrace what we shall call the Name Claim: a union 
must be designated by the word “marriage,” in the jurisdiction that recognizes it, 
in order to be treated as a marriage in federal law.
 The Name Claim is false. Since the founding of the country, federal law 
has recognized countless marriages that are not called “marriages” in the original 
recognizing jurisdiction. These are marriages from foreign countries where the 
language spoken is not English. Whatever word is used, the status created is the 
functional equivalent of marriage in American law and so is treated as such. This 
claim is similarly inapposite as applied to civil unions or domestic partnerships 
that are likewise functional equivalents to marriage. These alternative statuses were 
developed as a compromise to permit same-sex couples to access the full range of 
administrative benefits and supports of marriage, and commit to the obligations of 
marriage, while denying them the name. Couples who enter into such unions thus 
make exactly the same legal commitments to each other that couples who marry 
make to each other. Indeed, in the pre-Windsor world, the federal government treated 
them as marriages, denying recognition even where federal statutes otherwise 
would have required it.8 In the post-Windsor world, they similarly should be treated 
as marriages. Because the Name Claim is false, and because that claim is the basis 
for distinguishing “domestic partnerships” and “civil unions” from marriages, 
alternative statuses that provide full state marital rights should be recognized as 
triggering “marital” benefits and obligations under federal law.
 Part I of this Article describes state domestic partnerships and civil unions. 
Part II describes the federal refusal to recognize them after Windsor. Part III 
argues that just as the federal government routinely recognizes foreign marriages, 
even when called something other than “marriage,” it should recognize state civil 
unions or domestic partnerships that are likewise legally indistinguishable from 
state-level marriages. 
I. cIvIl unIons and domestIc partnersHIps as marrIage equIvalents
 The practice of designating legal recognition of same-sex couples by some 
name other than marriage was a political compromise. It arose as part of an effort 
to disaggregate two different issues in the same-sex marriage debate.
 That debate is really two different debates. The first is a normative debate 
about what relationships to value or even to sanctify. The second is a debate about 
administration—about which relationships ought to have legal consequences. 
 The normative debate, which has religious dimensions for many, concerns 
what relationships are intrinsically valuable. The key question is one about objective 
moral reality: are same-sex relationships as such morally equal to heterosexual 
8.     This is most evident in the Social Security context. See infra text accompanying notes 26 
and 36−37. 
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relationships, or do heterosexual relationships partake of a good that homosexual 
relationships cannot possibly share? 
 On this issue, Americans are divided, with different groups adhering to two 
very different moral visions. According to the anti-same-sex-marriage vision, sex 
can be morally worthy precisely and only because of its place in procreation. Even 
the marriages of infertile heterosexual couples take their meaning from the fact 
that they form a union of the procreative kind, and their bodily union therefore 
has procreative significance. From this perspective, the movement for same-sex 
marriage is a misguided attempt to deny fundamental moral distinctions.9 
 According to the pro-same-sex-marriage moral vision, sex is valuable either 
in itself or because it draws us toward friendship of a singular degree and kind. 
This bringing together of persons has intrinsic worth, whether or not it leads to 
childbearing or child-rearing. On this account, sexuality is linked to the flourishing 
of the next generation only to the extent that it is one of a number of factors that can 
bond adults together into stable familial units in which children are likely to thrive. 
It is not necessary or even important that the children be the biological product 
of the adults’ sex acts. From this perspective, it is the devaluation of same-sex 
intimacy that is immoral, because it reflects arbitrary and irrational discrimination.
 The administrative debate concerns what relationships between persons 
ought to be given legal recognition. Here the issue is the more mundane one of how 
resources should be allocated and unfair disruption of people’s lives prevented. 
Like it or not, relationships of dependency exist in households of every kind. From 
those relationships, one can reasonably infer what the members of those households 
would want and need if some unprovided-for contingency arises, such as the illness 
or death of one of them. 
 Because the moral and the administrative questions are distinct, many U.S. 
states opted to grant same-sex couples the rights of married couples without the 
honorific of “marriage.” The first state to do so was Vermont, which enacted a civil 
union law in 2000 in response to a court order to create a status that was functionally 
equivalent to marriage.10 Over the next fourteen years, thirteen additional states 
created civil unions or domestic partnerships that provided full state-level spousal
9.     For a fuller description and critique of this view, see Andrew Koppelman, Judging the 
Case Against Same-Sex Marriage, 2014 U. Ill. L. rev. 431 (2014). Government action 
premised on many of the assumptions underlying this view violates constitutional sex dis-
crimination principles. See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and 
Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 n.y.u. l. rev. 197 (1994); Deborah A. Widiss, Elizabeth 
L. Rosenblatt & Douglas NeJaime, Exposing Sex Stereotypes in Recent Same-Sex Marriage 
Jurisprudence, 30 Harv. J.l. & gender 461 (2007). 
10.     An Act Relating to Civil Unions, 1999 Vt. Laws 91 (largely codified at vt. stat. ann. 
tit. 15, §§ 1201–1207 (2002), tit. 18, §§ 5160–5169 (2000) (repealed 2009)). Vermont stopped 
permitting same-sex couples to form civil unions when it began permitting them to marry. See 
An Act Relating to Civil Marriage, 2009 Vt. Laws 3, § 12. 
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rights.11 Some, like Vermont’s, were created to satisfy guarantees of equality under 
state constitutions.12 In other states, such as California, the rights and obligations 
available under a more limited domestic partnership were gradually expanded until 
the status encompassed full marital rights.13 And in a few states, such as Colorado, 
civil unions were created as a mechanism to provide same-sex couples with the 
benefits and protections of marriage without running afoul of a state constitutional 
amendment limiting marriage itself to the union of a man and a woman.14 In many 
states, these alternative statuses were only available to same-sex couples; in a few 
states, they were available to same-sex and different-sex couples.15 
 Civil unions and domestic partnerships are controversial. Many conservatives 
think that same-sex relationships are morally wrong and should not be given any 
recognition at all by the state. Gay rights advocates object that withholding the name 
of “marriage” implies an inferior status. But their legal effect is clear. Under state 
law in most U.S. jurisdictions, these alternative statuses are treated as marriages. 
 Importantly, this is true even though the myriad provisions of state law that 
reference marriage were not themselves amended to add a reference to a “domestic 
partner” or “member of a civil union.” Rather, the acts that created the statuses 
either globally redefined “marriage” and “spouse” to include these alternative 
statuses or globally granted the rights of marriage to couples in such statuses. 
 For example, New Jersey’s Civil Union Act provides that:
Whenever in any law, rule, regulation, judicial or administrative 
proceeding or otherwise, reference is made to “marriage,” “husband,” 
“wife,” “spouse,” “family,” “immediate family,” “dependent,” “next 
of kin,” “widow,” “widower,” “widowed” or another word which 
11.     States or jurisdictions that created alternative statuses that, at least at some times, 
provided full or virtually full marital rights were: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Nevada, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. See nat’l conF. oF st. legIslatures, supra note 4. 
The rights accorded under a few of these states’ regimes differed slightly from those available 
under marriage, but they were in almost all respects functionally equivalent to marriage. We 
refer to the statuses in these jurisdictions as according “full” marriage rights, as opposed to 
the kind of limited domestic partnerships that excluded many key marital rights, such as those 
in Maine and Wisconsin. See id. 
12.     See, e.g., An Act Concerning Marriage and Civil Unions, 2006 N.J. Laws 103, § 1; An 
Act Relating to Civil Unions, 1999 Vt. Laws 91, §§ 1−2 (Adj. Sess.); see also Lewis v. Har-
ris, 908 A.2d 196, 213–14 (N.J. 2006). 
13.     See, e.g., Melissa Murray, Paradigms Lost: How Domestic Partnership Went from In-
novation to Injury, 37 n.y.u. rev. l. & soc. cHange 291 (2013) (describing the evolution of 
domestic partnership rights in California law).
14.     See colo. rev. stat. ann. §§ 14-15-101, 102 (West 2005 & Supp. 2014).
15.     States where they are or were available to same-sex and different-sex couples include 
Hawaii and Illinois, as well as California where only different-sex couples over the age of 
sixty-two may register as domestic partners. nat’l conF. oF st. legIslatures, supra note 4. 
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in a specific context denotes a marital or spousal relationship, the 
same shall include a civil union . . . .16 
Similarly, Nevada’s Domestic Partnership Act provides that:
Domestic partners have the same rights, protections, and benefits, 
and are subject to the same responsibilities, obligations, and 
duties under law, whether derived from statutes, administrative 
regulations, court rules, government policies, common law or any 
other provisions or sources of law, as are granted to and imposed 
upon spouses.17
And Oregon’s domestic partner law, the Oregon Family Fairness Act, provides that:
Any privilege, immunity, right or benefit granted by statute, 
administrative or court rule, policy, common law or any other law to 
an individual because the individual is or was married, . . . is granted 
on equivalent terms, substantive and procedural, to an individual 
because the individual is or was in a domestic partnership . . . .18
In other words, these statutes make clear that these alternative statuses are legally 
equivalent to marriage and that parties to a civil union or a domestic partnership 
are legally equivalent to spouses. Couples who enter into “full” civil unions or 
domestic partnerships thus agree to exactly the same bundle of obligations and 
promises to support each other that married couples do.19
16.     n.J. stat. ann. § 37:1–33 (West 2002 & Supp. 2014) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., 
750 Ill. comp. stat. ann. 75/10 (West 2009 & Supp. 2014) (“‘Party to a civil union’ means, 
and shall be included in, any definition or use of the terms ‘spouse,’ ‘family,’ ‘immediate fam-
ily,’ ‘dependent,’ ‘next of kin’, and other terms that denote the spousal relationship, as those 
terms are used throughout the law.”).
17.     nev. rev. stat. ann. § 122A.200(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2010) (emphasis added). Colo-
rado’s Civil Union Act includes almost exactly the same language. colo. rev. stat. ann. § 
14-15-107 (West 2005 & Supp. 2014). See also cal. Fam. code § 297.5 (West 2004); Haw. 
rev. stat. § 572B-9 (West 2008 & Supp. 2013); 750 Ill. comp. stat. ann. 75/5 (West 2009 
& Supp. 2014) (all including similar provisions globally granting members of civil unions or 
domestic partnerships all the rights, obligations, and duties of spouses).
18.     or. rev. stat. § 106.340 (2013) (emphasis added). There are a few very small distinc-
tions between rights under Oregon’s domestic partner law and under its marriage law. See 
Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1134–35 (D. Or. 2014) (identifying a few distinc-
tions). 
19.     Indeed, as Melissa Murray has noted, when California expanded the rights and obliga-
tions of domestic partnership to full marital rights, there was a notable uptick in dissolution of 
the earlier, more limited domestic partnerships, presumably because couples did not want to 
owe each other full marital rights. See Murray, supra note 13, at 302–03.
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 Broadly speaking, there are three primary reasons why a couple might enter 
into an alternative status.20 The first—and most obvious—is that for many same-
sex couples, it was a mechanism to express their love and commitment, and obtain 
the tangible rights and benefits of marriage, when marriage itself was precluded. 
In other words, for these couples, the alternative was a second-best substitute. 
But there are also likely some same-sex (and, in states where permitted, different-
sex) couples who affirmatively chose to enter into an alternative status precisely 
because it was not marriage—that is, it was a way to acknowledge commitment to 
a partner by forming a union that was not tainted by marriage’s exclusionary and 
patriarchal history. And finally, there are also likely some couples who may act 
for instrumental, rather than ideological or political, reasons. These couples may 
have rationally decided that it is advantageous to be treated as “married” under 
state law but not under federal law. For example, when Windsor was decided, there 
was widespread discussion of the extent to which federal tax law can impose a 
“marriage penalty” on couples who make roughly the same level of income; some 
couples might therefore have opted to remain in an alternative status rather than 
marry.21 Importantly, some states explicitly invited such considerations by making 
alternative statuses available to different-sex couples only if they were over age 
sixty-two; this permits older adults to formalize a new relationship without risking 
the discontinuation of federal Social Security benefits or other pension benefits they 
might be receiving as a widow, widower, or divorcee.22  
  
II. Federal nonrecognItIon oF cIvIl unIons
 More than one thousand federal rights or benefits are premised on marriage; 
these laws generally use marriage as an efficient (although imprecise) proxy for 
identifying couples who have made long-term commitments to each other and 
20.     Our thanks to Doug NeJaime for helping us articulate these distinctions. 
21.     See, e.g., Same-Sex Marriage After DOMA, tHe KoJo nnamdI sHow (July 8, 2013), 
http://thekojonnamdishow.org/shows/2013-07-08/same-sex-marriage-after-doma/transcript 
(advising same-sex couples in DC who would pay a marriage “penalty” to form a DC domes-
tic partnership instead). 
22.     See, e.g., wasH. rev. code § 26.60.010 (West 2014) (legislative finding stating “the 
public interest would be served by extending rights and benefits to couples in which either or 
both of the partners are at least sixty-two years of age . . . . [who] are entitled to marry under 
the state’s marriage statutes, [but where] some social security and pension laws nevertheless 
make it impractical for these couples to marry”); see generally Carla Hartley, How Changes 
in Domestic Partnership Laws Affect Our Senior Citizens, Avvo (Aug. 14, 2010), http://www.
avvo.com/legal-guides/ugc/how-changes-in-domestic-partnership-laws-affect-our-senior-citi-
zens (discussing how forming an alternative status may be advantageous to senior citizens); 
Lornet Turnbull, Heterosexual Seniors Lost in the Furor over Domestic Partnership, seattle 
tImes (Sept. 6, 2009, 5:54 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2009814434_r71se-
niors06m.html#_ga=1.161430269.179428502.1423012443.
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who have likely integrated their finances.23 Prior to the enactment of the Defense 
of Marriage Act (DOMA) in 1996, federal agencies and courts administering 
federal law consistently followed state definitions of marriage.24 The only issues of 
recognition have involved conflicts between the laws of different states. 
 DOMA, however, stated that in federal statutes or regulations, marriage and 
spouse were to be interpreted only to refer to different-sex unions.25 Accordingly, until 
Windsor was decided, the federal government denied recognition to same-sex marriages. 
And, crucially important, prior to Windsor, federal agencies interpreted DOMA as 
also precluding recognition of same-sex civil unions or domestic partnerships. This is 
apparent from the Social Security Administration’s refusal to recognize such alternative 
statuses under the Social Security Act, even where application of the plain language of 
the authorizing statute would otherwise have required it.26 
 In other words, in the pre-Windsor world, the federal government treated 
same-sex domestic partnerships and civil unions as “marriages” functionally barred 
by DOMA. Accordingly, when Windsor was decided and the relevant provisions of 
DOMA were no longer enforceable, the agencies that administer the vast array of 
federal benefits, privileges, and obligations premised on marriage needed to determine 
whether they would recognize civil unions or domestic partnerships. This was an 
open question at the time—and, unfortunately, it has been answered incorrectly. 
 The federal agencies that have issued guidance responding to Windsor have 
been almost uniform in refusing to recognize civil unions or domestic partnerships 
as providing access to federal “marriage” benefits or obligations (with Social 
Security being a prominent exception, as discussed below). The Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) was among the first agencies to issue such guidance, and it was 
one of the few to provide any kind of explanation for refusing to recognize domestic 
partnerships or civil unions. According to OPM’s initial guidance on employee 
benefits, this exclusion was justified because “[t]he Supreme Court’s decision 
addressed the constitutionality of a statute that defined ‘marriage’ and ‘spouse’ for 
23.     See Deborah A. Widiss, Leveling Up After DOMA, 89 Ind. l.J. 43, 46–50 (2014).
24.     In a few discrete contexts, most prominently immigration, the federal government re-
quires evidence of a valid state marriage and additional factors demonstrating “real” commit-
ment. See Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100 calIF. l. rev. 1, 30–37 (2012). 
25.     1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012).
26.     See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
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purposes of federal law to include only opposite-sex couples.”27 This sentence, of 
course, logically entails nothing about the recognition or nonrecognition of civil 
unions, so it is no explanation at all.
 Later, when issuing new regulations for the federal employee health benefits 
program, OPM stated, in response to comments that had suggested providing benefits 
to same-sex domestic partners, it could not do so because the relevant federal 
statute “defines ‘member of [employee’s] family’ to mean the employee’s ‘spouse’ 
and certain children. Same-sex domestic partners are not encompassed within the 
statutory definition of member of family.”28 Here it becomes clear that the Name 
Claim is doing the work. It is because—and only because—those domestic partners 
are not called “spouses” that they cannot be recognized for federal purposes. By this 
reasoning, civil unions or domestic partners should be recognized if the state statutes 
provided that members of them were labeled “spouses.” (This argument is especially 
perverse as applied to state laws, like New Jersey’s, that actually do provide that 
members of civil unions are encompassed within statutory references to “spouse.”29)
 Most agencies other than OPM have denied recognition to civil unions or 
domestic partnerships without any discussion of the rationale for doing so. For 
example, the IRS issued a lengthy opinion letter explaining why it was adopting a 
place of celebration approach for determining which marriages are valid, and how 
it would interpret “husband” and “wife” as gender neutral where necessary to avoid 
potential constitutional problems, but then simply making a conclusory statement, 
without any analysis, that the terms would not be interpreted to encompass registered 
27.     U.S. oFFIce oF pers. mgmt., BeneFIts admIn. letter no. 13-203, coverage oF same-
sex spouses at 1–2 (2013), http://www.opm.gov/retirement-services/publications-forms/
benefits-administration-letters/2013/13-203.pdf; see also U.S. oFFIce oF gov’t etHIcs, la-
13-10, eFFect oF tHe supreme court’s decIsIon In United StateS v. WindSor on tHe executIve 
BrancH etHIcs program 2 (2013) http://www.oge.gov/OGE-Advisories/Legal-Advisories/
Assets-non-searchable/LA-13-10--Effect-of-the-Supreme-Court-s-Decision-in-United-States-
v--Windsor-on-the-Executive-Branch-Ethics-Program-(PDF)/ (providing the same explana-
tion regarding government ethics rules, although suggesting that a domestic partner might be 
recognized as a member of a household or a relative); U.S. oFFIce oF pers. mgmt., trIBal 
BeneFIts admIn. letter no. 13-601, coverage oF same-sex spouses 1 (2013), http://www.
opm.gov/healthcare-insurance/tribal-employers/hr-personnel/bals/13-601.pdf (providing the 
same explanation regarding access to tribal employee benefits).
28.     Final Rule Amending Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 
64,873, 64,875 (Oct. 30, 2013) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 8901(5) (2012)). In this amendment to the 
regulations, OPM did make clear that a child of a federal employee’s domestic partner could, 
in certain circumstances, be eligible for coverage as a step-child. See id. at 64,877 (to be 
codified at 5 C.F.R. § 890.302(2)(b)). OPM offered the same explanation regarding a statutory 
reference to “spouses” as the justification for denying FMLA leave rights to domestic part-
ners. Frequently Asked Questions: Same Sex Domestic Partner Benefits, u.s. oFFIce person-
nel mgmt., http://www.opm.gov/faqs/topic/domesticpartner/?page=2 (Feb. 13, 2015).
29.     E.g., n.J. stat. ann. § 37:1–33 (West 2002 & Supp. 2014). 
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domestic partnerships or civil unions.30 (This ruling causes practical difficulties for 
couples who are accordingly treated as married for state purposes but unmarried 
for federal purposes, a particular challenge in community property states such as 
Nevada or California.31) Likewise, again without discussion or explanation, the 
Department of Labor stated that it will not require pension plan administrators 
to recognize civil unions or domestic partnerships.32 The State Department does 
not consider a civil union or domestic partnership sufficient to sponsor a partner 
for immigration purposes.33 Civil unions and domestic partnerships are generally 
not recognized for Medicare or Medicaid purposes,34 and income of a partner in a 
civil union or domestic partnership will not be considered when determining an 
individual’s eligibility for financial aid.35 
 There are a few agencies that provide some discrete benefits to couples in 
civil unions or domestic partnerships. Most significantly, in June 2014, the Social 
Security Administration (SSA) announced that it would recognize civil unions or 
domestic partnerships that provide inheritance rights, following provisions in the 
Social Security Act that state explicitly that individuals may claim benefits based 
on relationships that are not “marriages” under a claimant’s home state’s law but 
that provide a right to inherit intestate.36 This is a welcomed policy development. 
However, the rationale on which the SSA made the determination is circumscribed 
in its applicability; it is premised on accepting the assertion that these relationships 
are not “marriages” but are covered by particular statutory language related to 
30.     See Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.r.B. 201; see also Answers to Frequently Asked 
Questions for Registered Domestic Partners and Individuals in Civil Unions, Irs, http://
www.irs.gov/uac/Answers-to-Frequently-Asked-Questions-for-Registered-Domestic-Partners-
and-Individuals-in-Civil-Unions (last updated Aug. 19, 2014).
31.     See Answers to Frequently Asked Questions for Registered Domestic Partners and Indi-
viduals in Civil Unions, supra note 30 (discussing how to handle such dual filings). 
32.     emp. BeneFIts sec. admIn., u.s. dep’t oF laBor, tecHnIcal release no. 2013-04, 
guIdance to employee BeneFIt plans on tHe deFInItIon oF “spouse” and “marrIage” under 
erIsa and tHe supreme court’s decIsIon In United StateS v. WindSor (2013), http://www.
dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/tr13-04.pdf.
33.     U.S. Visas for Same-Sex Spouses: FAQs for Post-Defense of Marriage Act, u.s. dep’t 
st., http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/DOMA/DOMA%20FAQs.pdf (Mar. 21, 2015).
34.     ctrs. For medIcare & medIcaId servs., u.s. dep’t oF HealtH & Human servs., sHo 
no. 13-006, re: United StateS v. WindSor (2013), http://www.medicaid.gov/Federal-Policy-
Guidance/downloads/SHO-13-006.pdf. Civil unions and domestic partnerships may occasion-
ally be recognized if states administering the programs recognize such statuses as marriages. 
Id. at 1−2; see also infra text accompanying note 41. 
35.     u.s. dep’t oF educ., GEN-13-25, supreme court rulIng on tHe deFense oF marrIage 
act and tHe ImplIcatIons For tHe tItle Iv student FInancIal assIstance programs (2013), 
http://www.ifap.ed.gov/dpcletters/attachments/GEN1325.pdf.
36.     See Public Health and Welfare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A)(ii) (2012); see also 
U.S. soc. sec. admIn., gn 00210.004, non-marItal legal relatIonsHIps (sucH as cIvIl 
unIons and domestIc partnersHIps) (2014), available at https://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/
lnx/0200210004.
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inheritance rights, rather than properly recognizing that these relationships are 
functional marriages and should be treated as such. (Because the statute also 
prescribes a domicile approach to determining which marriages are recognized, the 
SSA, unlike any other federal agency, accords “marital” rights to civil unions or 
domestic partnerships, but it is not yet clear whether it will provide benefits to couples 
with out-of-state marriages that are not recognized in a same-sex couple’s home state.37) 
 Additionally, prior to Windsor, both the U.S. Department of Defense and 
the Department of Veterans Affairs were considering proposals to recognize such 
alternative statuses for certain limited purposes. In guidance issued since Windsor, 
these agencies have suggested they will move forward on these plans,38 although 
the Department of Defense abandoned a more ambitious plan to establish its own 
domestic partnership status that would have provided the full range of “spousal” 
benefits to partners of military employees.39 OPM makes limited employment 
benefits available to same-sex partners of federal civilian employees under 
provisions that reference “family members,” or pursuant to executive orders that 
encourage or require agencies to grant specific benefits to domestic partners.40 And 
the Department of Health and Human Services has suggested that, because Medicaid 
and the Children’s Health Insurance Program are administered as federal-state 
partnerships, a state may choose to recognize civil unions or domestic partnerships 
for these programs if it “recognizes . . . [such statuses] as a marriage.”41  
 Despite these rare exceptions, the relative uniformity of the denial of federal 
benefits has bolstered arguments that civil unions or domestic partnerships are 
an inadequate substitute for marriage. Prior to Windsor, such claims focused on 
necessarily abstract discussions of the symbolic importance of the word “marriage” 
37.     See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A)(i); see also roBIn marIl & carroll estes, Hum. rts. 
campaIgn & nat’l comm. to preserve soc. sec. & medIcare, lIvIng outsIde tHe saFety 
net: lgBt FamIlIes & socIal securIty (2014), http://www.ncpssmfoundation.org/Portals/0/
lgbt-report.pdf.
38.     See Declaration/Dissolution of a Same-Sex Domestic Partnership for DEERS Enroll-
ment, 78 Fed. Reg. 54,634 (Sept. 5, 2013); Vet Center Services, 78 Fed. Reg. 57,067, 57,067–
69 (Sept. 17, 2013) (to be codified at 38 C.F.R. pt. 17) (allowing domestic partners access to 
services, but only for certain kinds of counseling).
39.     See Memorandum from Chuck Hagel, Sec’y of Def., to Sec’ys of the Military Dep’ts 
Under Sec’y of Def. for Pers. & Readiness, Extending Benefits to the Same-Sex Spouses 
of Military Members (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2013/docs/
Extending-Benefits-to-Same-Sex-Spouses-of-Military-Members.pdf (stating that “the exten-
sion of benefits to the same-sex domestic partners of military members is no longer necessary 
to remedy the inequity that was caused by section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act”).
40.     See generally FeddesK, Federal guIde: 2013 domestIc partner guIde (2013), http://
feddesk.com/freehandbooks/042613-1.pdF (reviewing the extent to which domestic partners 
could qualify for benefits prior to the Windsor decision in 2013). It is possible that some agen-
cies may scale back access to such domestic partner benefits for employees in states where 
they can now marry a same-sex partner. 
41.     ctrs. For medIcare & medIcaId servs., supra note 34, at 4−5.
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or the insult implied in establishing a separate status for (at least primarily) gay 
and lesbian couples. But now the injury is obvious and tangible. This argument 
was successful in New Jersey42 and Oregon,43 and in cases in Illinois that granted 
terminally ill members of civil unions the right to marry before that right was 
generally available.44 In these cases, the state defendants have generally argued 
that the federal government should simply recognize such alternative statuses as 
marriages. The New Jersey court, at least, considered this a plausible alternative 
approach but was unwilling to shift responsibility away from the states themselves.45
III. tHe Fallacy oF tHe name claIm
 The law of recognition of foreign marriages has been well settled for a long 
time. Ordinarily, a marriage valid where celebrated is valid everywhere.46 Since the 
founding of the country, the federal government has routinely recognized marriages 
celebrated in foreign countries.47 After Windsor, Secretary of State John Kerry 
announced that the same rule would be applied to foreign same-sex marriages: “As 
long as a marriage has been performed in a jurisdiction that recognizes it so that it 
is legal, then that marriage is valid under U.S. immigration laws, and every married 
couple will be treated exactly the same . . . .”48
 Recall the Name Claim: a union must be designated by the word “marriage,” 
in the jurisdiction that recognizes it, in order to be treated as a marriage in federal law.
 The Name Claim is inconsistent with more than two centuries of federal 
practice. Most of the world’s population does not speak English and so does not use 
the word “marriage.” In German, the word is “Ehe.” In Spanish, it is “matrimonio.” 
42.     Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 82 A.3d 336, 367–68 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2013).
43.     Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1143–44 (D. Or. 2014).
44.     Lee v. Orr, No. 13-cv-8719, 2013 WL 6490577, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2013); Gray v. 
Orr, 4 F. Supp. 3d 984, 992–94 (N.D. Ill. 2013).
45.     See, e.g., Garden State Equal., 82 A.3d at 365.
46.     peter Hay, patrIcK J. BorcHers & symeon c. symeonIdes, conFlIct oF laws 621–23 
(5th ed. 2010); restatement (second) oF conFlIct oF laws § 283(2) (1971); restatement 
oF conFlIct oF laws § 121 (1934); JosepH story, commentarIes on tHe conFlIct oF laws, 
ForeIgn and domestIc, In regard to contracts, rIgHts, and remedIes, and especIally In 
regard to marrIages, dIvorces, wIlls, successIons, and Judgments 187–88 (Melville M. 
Bigelow ed., 8th ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1883) (1834). For an overview of the rel-
evant law, see andrew Koppelman, same sex, dIFFerent states: wHen same-sex marrIages 
cross state lInes (2006).
47.     We have been unable to find a citation for this obvious fact. The practice is so routine 
that, so far as we can tell, it has never occurred to anyone to question it. For a discussion of 
current law, see Marriage Abroad, u.s. dep’t st., http://www.travel.state.gov/content/pass-
ports/english/abroad/events-and-records/marriage.html (Mar. 22, 2015).
48.     Daniel Politi, Kerry: Same-Sex Married Couples Will Receive Equal Treatment During 
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In Chinese, it is “Hūnyīn.” And so forth. The same is true with respect to “spouse,” 
on which the OPM’s reasoning turns. German: “Gattin.” Spanish: “cónyuge.” 
Chinese: “Pèi’ǒu.” Marriages originally denominated with these words have always 
been recognized in federal law. If the Name Claim truly controls federal policy, 
we could conclude that American practice has been wrong all these years. That, 
however, would be crazy. The other alternative is to say that the OPM and other 
federal agencies have not adequately analyzed the question before it.
 As discussed in Part I, many states created civil unions or domestic 
partnerships that provide full marital rights to same-sex couples and impose full 
marital obligations on couples. The couples who enter such relationships thus make 
precisely the same commitment to each other that married couples make—in most 
instances, they commit to an open-ended, hopefully lifelong, partnership in which 
they will share their property and income and support each other in providing the 
necessities of life.49 Federal law incorporates by reference state marriage law,50 and 
state marriage law explicitly states that such alternative statuses are to be treated 
as marriages.51 Thus, regardless of the name attached to the status, the relationship 
should be recognized, triggering marital rights, benefits, and responsibilities 
under federal law, just as foreign marriages trigger marital rights, benefits, and 
responsibilities under federal law. 
 Put differently, the civil union and domestic partnership statutes aim to 
separate out social meaning from administrative consequences and to create a 
functional equivalent of marriage with all the same administrative consequences. 
Federal recognition is an administrative consequence of state marriage and thus 
federal recognition should flow from the entrance into a marriage-equivalent status. 
Indeed, the state and federal systems are intended to work together. For example, an
49.     Of course, both same-sex and different-sex couples may depart from statutory defaults 
through prenuptial or postnuptial agreements.
50.     As noted above, there is variation between federal laws that look to only the state law 
where the couple is domiciled, see, e.g., Public Health and Welfare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)
(1)(A)(i) (2012) (explaining Social Security will recognize a marriage if the courts of the state 
where the couple was domiciled would recognize the marriage), and federal laws that will 
recognize any valid state marriage, even if the couple’s domicile state does not recognize it, 
emp. BeneFIts sec. admIn., supra note 32 (explaining that in interpreting ERISA, “the term 
‘spouse’ will be read to refer to any individuals who are lawfully married under any state 
law”). But the more general proposition—that federal law looks to state law to determine 
valid marriages—is generally consistent across the federal code, other than in a few discrete 
contexts, such as immigration, where federal law may require showing of a valid state mar-
riage and additional factors. See generally Abrams, supra note 24. 
51.     See supra text accompanying notes 16–19. 
68
   Spring 2015                                                          A Marriage By Any Other Name
individual or couple’s personal state income tax filings are built on the foundation 
of an individual or couple’s federal income tax filing.52 
 A potential objection to our argument—which may be what the OPM 
and other federal agencies have in mind, although if so it is barely articulated—
is that the social meaning, and so perhaps the felt significance and durability, of 
marriage is so different from that of civil unions or domestic partnerships that it is 
appropriate for the federal government to treat the two differently.53 Once again, 
however, Congress has made no such judgment. The federal law rests on state law 
and should follow the state legislative judgment that these statuses are to operate as 
functional marriages.
 Our claim that the federal government should recognize civil unions and 
domestic partnerships is limited simply to alternative statuses that include full state 
marital rights and obligations. In states that have created alternative statuses that 
provide only partial state marital rights, the federal government could reasonably 
distinguish between such unions—formed by either same-sex or different-sex 
couples—and marriages or alternative statuses that are fully equivalent to marriages. 
Thus, for example, the federal government should recognize couples who have 
formed civil unions in Colorado because they have committed to a relationship that 
provides all of the “rights, benefits, protections, duties, obligations, responsibilities, 
and other incidents under law as are granted to or imposed upon spouses.”54 The 
federal government could, however, reasonably decide that it would not grant 
federal “marital” rights to (same-sex or different-sex) couples who register as 
“designated beneficiaries” under a different provision of Colorado law that permits 
individuals to commit to some, but not all, marital rights.55 This is the same kind of 
distinction that the federal government currently makes between French marriages 
and the more limited “pacte civil” that is popular in France.56 That said, as one of us 
has argued elsewhere, the federal government should reconsider more generally the 
extent to which it relies solely on marriage—or marriage-equivalent—relationships 
to provide access to core federal rights and responsibilities supporting families.57 
52.     See, e.g., Ind. dep’t oF revenue, IndIana It-40 Full-year resIdent IndIvIdual Income 
tax BooKlet 9 (2013) (explaining that individuals “must complete [their] federal income tax 
return before starting [their] Indiana income tax return [because] [l]ine numbers from [the] 
federal income tax return are referenced in many of the [Indiana] instructions”); see also 
Answers to Frequently Asked Questions for Registered Domestic Partners and Individuals 
in Civil Unions, supra note 30 (discussing how to handle dual filings required by the federal 
refusal to recognize civil unions or domestic partnerships that trigger state marital rights). 
53.     Our thanks to Tobias Wolff for helping us articulate this point. 
54.     colo. rev. stat. ann. § 14-15-107(1) (West 2005 & Supp. 2014).
55.     See colo. rev. stat. ann. §§ 15-22-101 to 15-22-106 (West 2011 & Supp. 2014).
56.     u.s. emBassy, marrIage and pacs (cIvIl partnersHIps) In France (2014), http://pho-
tos.state.gov/libraries/france/45994/acs/usc_paris-marriage.pdf. 
57.     See Widiss, supra note 23, at 62–65 & nn.88−104, for a discussion of the advantages of 
unbundling marital privileges under federal law. 
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Some benefits that are currently limited to married couples should be made 
available to a broader array of relationships; others might be effectively tailored 
more narrowly.58 
 We contend automatic federal recognition of alternative statuses is 
appropriate regardless of why a couple may have chosen to enter into the alternative 
status—so long as the status was in fact the legal equivalent of marriage. As noted 
above, there are three primary categories here: (1) couples who formed civil 
unions or domestic partnerships as a second-best option because marriage was 
not permitted; (2) couples who formed civil unions or domestic partnerships as a 
mechanism for expressing their commitment while also registering opposition to 
or discomfort with the institution of marriage; and (3) couples who formed civil 
unions or domestic partnerships to take advantage of being “married” for state 
purposes and “unmarried” for federal purposes. 
 Application of our argument to couples in the first category—those who 
would have preferred to marry if they could have—is easy. (Our intuition is that 
this is probably the largest category by far; however, we do not know of data that 
establishes this definitively.) There are undoubtedly some such couples where one 
partner no longer has the capacity to consent to a formal legal relationship.59 For 
these couples, the new availability of legal marriage provides no recourse, but the 
federal government has the authority to ensure that they are not currently harmed by 
the lingering effects of prior discrimination. Like the federal government’s embrace 
of place-of-celebration rules, this offers a mechanism for the federal government to 
help remedy the injury caused by state discrimination against same-sex couples. 
 Even couples in this first category who have since married may be 
injured by the federal government’s refusal to recognize that they made “marital” 
commitments to each other within such alternative statuses. For example, after 
Windsor was decided, the Internal Revenue Service permitted same-sex couples 
who were married to amend earlier tax returns so they could claim refunds where 
they would have owed less money if their marriages had been recognized.60 Couples 
58.     See id.
59.     For a discussion of same-sex couples in California who formed domestic partnerships 
but cannot or choose not to marry, see Responsive Brief of Plaintiff Class Re Subsequent 
Legal Developments at 7–8, Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, No. CV 4:10-01564-CW, 
2014 WL 6844926 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2014). The plaintiffs in Dragovich had claimed that the 
refusal to recognize California domestic partnerships as “marriages” under federal law, which 
in turn meant that they were also not recognized under a California benefit plan, violated the 
Equal Protection and Due Process clauses. The court ultimately denied the Plaintiff’s class’s 
request for further discovery to identify specific couples who faced barriers to marriage, 
deeming the issue too individualized for class relief, and, in the absence of evidence of such 
harms, granted summary judgment to the government on these claims. See Dragovich v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Treasury, No. CV 4:10-01564-CW, 2014 WL 6844926, at *5–6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 
2014). 
60.     Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.r.B. 201.
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who were in civil unions or domestic partnerships that were equivalent to marriage 
were not offered this opportunity. Similarly, eligibility for benefits under the Social 
Security Act can turn on the duration of a formal legal relationship prior to a claim 
being filed. The SSA has indicated that it will consider the length of marriages that 
pre-dated Windsor (and also, since it is recognizing domestic partnerships and civil 
unions, the length of these relationships that pre-dated Windsor), but it has not 
established whether it will “combine” such statuses when making determinations.61 
A couple in a civil union or domestic partnership who later marries risks resetting 
the clock—and for some couples, this could happen at just the wrong time. Similar 
issues can arise for spouses claiming benefits after the death of a federal employee, 
and at least one administrative law judge has properly reasoned that a California 
domestic partnership should be combined with a subsequent marriage when 
determining whether a statutory durational requirement had been met to avoid 
constitutional issues that would otherwise arise.62 
 We believe that federal recognition should also be automatic for couples in 
the third category—the instrumentalists. Federal law makes choices regarding the 
lines drawn among and between families. While one might disagree with some of the 
policies embedded in those categories, permitting a small number of couples to opt out 
of selective parts of the package distorts the larger policy choices. For example, the 
current federal policy of non-recognition permits couples who make relatively equal 
salaries to lessen their federal tax burden while enjoying the benefits of a functional 
marriage under state law. In states where alternative statuses are only available to 
same-sex couples, this disadvantages comparable different-sex couples, a strange 
inversion of the pre-Windsor inequalities. Even if both same-sex and different-sex 
couples are able to enter into an alternative status in a particular state, the existing 
federal policy causes interstate variation that likewise undermines federal policy 
objectives. Indeed, a primary argument in favor of the joint federal return in the first 
place was to address the fact that individual returns by married couples advantaged 
couples in states that had adopted community property regimes.63
 For related reasons, we believe that automatic federal recognition of state 
marriage equivalents is also appropriate in jurisdictions—such as in California—
where state legislators have made an alternative status that provides full marital 
rights only available to different-sex couples who were retirement-aged.64 Again, the 
61.     See U.S. soc. sec. admIn., supra note 36, ex.3.
62.     See Kapple v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., No. SF-0843-15-0082-I-1, 2015 WL 241655 
(M.S.P.B. Jan. 16, 2015) (interpreting “marriage” in federal statute to include domestic part-
nership and noting that doing so furthered the underlying purpose of the statutory language 
as identifying couples who had made a “serious, long-term commitment to one another”); see 
also In re Fonberg, 736 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. Jud. Council 2013) (holding failure to enroll the 
domestic partner of a federal employee under a family health plan was discrimination on the 
basis of sex and sexual orientation).
63.     See Widiss, supra note 23, at 48–49.
64.     See cal. Fam. code § 297(b)(5)(B) (West 2004 & Supp. 2015).
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federal Social Security system, and other federal policies, makes choices regarding 
what actions will trigger the cessation of benefits. Again, one might disagree with 
these choices, but it is problematic to offer a strategic opt-out to couples in only 
a few select states. States may, as New Jersey has, create alternative statuses that 
provide a discrete subset of marital rights, such as the right to make health care 
decisions for a partner or the right to inherit property tax free, available to senior 
citizens (or individuals more generally) who are not married.65 If such alternative 
statuses are not fully the equivalent of state marriage, they would not, under our 
analysis, automatically trigger federal recognition; that said, federal agencies and 
private actors could of course consider changing specific policies to encompass 
such statuses. 
 And finally, we believe that our argument applies to couples in the second 
category—the marriage “resisters.” Such couples have, despite their opposition to 
the institution of marriage, entered into a formal legal relationship that functions 
like a marriage. Presumably they therefore seek the administrative benefits that flow 
from such a relationship, and many might welcome federal recognition. Moreover, 
recognition through the indirect process of a federal statute incorporating a state 
definition of what “counts” as marriage would indicate no more support for the 
institution of marriage than their initial willingness to form the civil union or 
domestic partnership did. But whether or not such couples would choose federal 
recognition, we cannot imagine a practical mechanism that would effectively sort 
between couples who would opt out of federal recognition for sincere ideological 
reasons and couples who would opt out of federal recognition for the kind of 
instrumental reasons we have deemed inappropriate.
 Couples in any of these categories who would like to avoid federal 
recognition can of course dissolve their civil union or domestic partnership. And 
states can continue to experiment with alternative statuses that provide a more 
limited bundle of rights and responsibilities than marriages. But if a relationship 
entails full marital rights, benefits, and responsibilities under state law, it should 
likewise trigger marital rights and responsibilities under federal law—whatever 




 What is remarkable about the OPM’s and other federal agencies’ refusal to 
recognize civil unions and domestic partnerships is that it reproduces one of the 
central flaws of DOMA. DOMA denied recognition to thousands of marriages that 
65.     See n.J. dep’t oF HealtH, Reg-D33, regIsterIng a domestIc partnersHIp In new Jer-
sey (2012), http://www.state.nj.us/health/forms/reg-d33.pdf (explaining that limited domestic 
partnerships are available to same-sex or different-sex couples where a member of the couple 
is over sixty-two, whereas civil unions providing full marital rights are only available to 
same-sex couples). 
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were unquestionably valid under state law. In so doing, it thwarted the purposes 
of every federal law that recognized existing marriages. Those marriages were 
created by states in order to give administrative recognition to family relationships 
on which people depend.
 DOMA deemed the interest in nonrecognition of same-sex couples to be 
so overridingly urgent as to justify sacrificing a huge range of other government 
interests, some of the highest order.66 Bankruptcy courts could not accomplish 
efficient and predictable adjudication. Government employees could not insure their 
dependents. The Social Security survivor benefits program could not accomplish 
its goal of meeting the needs of dependents and beneficiaries. Retirees could not 
provide for the security of their dependent spouses. Income taxation could not take 
account of family obligations. National safety itself was compromised because 
the military could not provide its members’ families with healthcare, housing, and 
survivorship benefits that are essential to military effectiveness.67 
 The current federal policy perpetuates these pathologies by continuing to 
treat some couples as “married” for state purposes and “unmarried” for federal 
purposes. The ongoing harms that this policy imposes—on same-sex couples and 
on society as a whole—are unnecessary. Federal law, properly interpreted, permits 
recognition of state statuses that functionally are marriages. And furthermore, the 
U.S. Constitution may require recognition. That is, if it was unconstitutionally 
irrational for the government, through DOMA, to accept these costs in order to 
make a stand in opposition to same-sex marriage, then it seems likely that it is also 
unconstitutionally irrational for the government to continue to do so, not even for 
the sake of a gesture, but solely on the basis of a semantic confusion.
66.     This manifest devaluation of gay people was apparent on the face of the statute and did 
not depend on a showing of subjective intent to harm. See Andrew Koppelman, Beyond Lev-
els of Scrutiny: Windsor and “Bare Desire to Harm”, 64 case w. res. l. rev. 1045 (2014); 
Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6 wm. & mary BIll rts. J. 89, 
96–137 (1997). We are not attributing any such subjective intent to the OPM or other federal 
agencies.
67.     See Koppelman, Beyond Levels of Scrutiny: Windsor and “Bare Desire to Harm”, 
supra note 66, at 1063–65, for a documentation of these pathologies. 
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